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HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION: CAN THE
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS BE
PRESERVED UNDER A BIFURCATED STANDARD?
Both the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment' and the
common law rule against hearsay evidence2 restrict the admission of
out-of-court statements in criminal proceedings. The confrontation
clause guarantees the criminal defendant the right to face witnesses
against him, while the hearsay rule prevents the admission into evi-
dence of out-of-court statements made by persons not testifying at
trial.3 Although both standards appear to require the attendance and
testimony of witnesses at trial, they are not co-extensive.4 Certain
'U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the Witnesses against him . .. ."
'Professor McCormick defines hearsay as: "[Tiestimony in court, or written evi-
dence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion
to show the truth of the matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon
the credibility of the out-of-court asserter." McCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 246, at
584 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK] (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).
3The common law hearsay rule precludes the admission into evidence of out-of-
court statements. The premise behind this rule is that such evidence has not been
tested by cross-examination, nor has it been given under oath nor in the presence of
the trier of fact. The belief is that these three elements safeguard the jury from being
misled by unreliable information. Cross-examination is the most important element
since the jury may choose between competing sides and the reliability of the evidence
presented is assumed, because it is subject to the test of the opponent's challenges.
The oath solemnizes the testimony by threatening supernatural punishment and, more
immediately, perjury charges against those giving false testimony. Finally, it is be-
lieved that twelve tried and true laymen can determine the veracity of the witness'
testimony by observing his demeanor. 1 GREENLEAF, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 124 (15th ed.
1892) [hereinafter cited as GREENLEAF].
The following is an example of a hearsay statement. Hypothetically W is a testify-
ing witness, D is an out-of-court declarant, and A is the accused:
W: "D told me he and A were passing counterfeit Federal Reserve
Notes."
See generally MCCORMICK § 245, 5 J. WIGMORE, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 1361-65 (3d ed.
1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and Application of
the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REV. 177 (1948), [hereinafter cited as Morgan,
Hearsay Dangers]. See also, note 69 infra.
'Cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). Mr. Justice White speaking for the
majority stated:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confron-
tation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is
quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that
the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification
of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically
at common law.
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judicially created exceptions to the hearsay rule allow admission of
evidence ordinarily excluded as hearsay, because the circumstances
under which such evidence was obtained assure its reliability. 5 In
some situations evidence falling within such an exception, although
not barred by the hearsay rule, will infringe upon the defendant's
rights under the confrontation clause Conversely, the hearsay rule
may be violated while the confrontation clause is satisfied.' The dual
standard thus created by the confrontation clause and the hearsay
rule has been difficult to implement and has at times been misap-
plied.' The dynamic nature of the hearsay rule has exacerbated this
Id. at 155.
Contra, Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (right of confrontation is subject
to exceptions of hearsay rule, which are not static); Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S.
542 (1926) (purpose of sixth amendment was to preserve common law right of confron-
tation, not to broaden or distrub it); 5 WIGMORE § 1362 (confrontation clause merely
requires testimony taken infra-judicially under the hearsay rule to be subject to cross-
examination).
5'The hearsay rule is a principle of evidence designed to insure the reliability of
material admitted into evidence at trial. The rule was not designed to frustrate the
admission of evidence. A pure application of the rule, however, would many times
preclude introduction of valuable evidence. Hence the common law developed a body
of exceptions which allowed introduction of the evidence even though the declarant
was neither present at trial, nor subject to oath or cross-examination. The exceptions,
such as dying declarations and official documents, encompassed statements which
were thought to have been given under conditions sufficiently attesting to their relia-
bility, thus rendering the safeguards of oath and cross-examination superfluous. See
authorities cited in notes 68-70 infra and accompanying text.
'See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In that case the confession
of a co-defendant which similarly inculpated the defendant was admitted into evidence
through the testimony of a third party. The statement was admissible under the co-
conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, but the admission of the confession was held
to have violated the defendant's right to confrontation because the co-defendant was
not produced on the stand for cross-examination.
TSee, e.g., United States v. Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 983 (1973). A government witness who aided in the capture of the defendants
initialled a typed statement implicating the defendants. At trial the witness denied
making the statement or knowing the defendants, but the typed statement was admit-
ted into evidence. The Second Circuit conceded that there was no applicable hearsay
rule exception, but found the admission of the statement harmless error. No sixth
amendment violations existed since the witness was present and available for cross-
examination. Id. at 69-70.
Case examples of violations of the hearsay rule but not the confrontation clause
are sparse since courts ordinarily reach constitutional issues only if the case is not
disposed of on other grounds. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297
U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Since a violation of the hearsay rule
generally would be dispositive of the case, the court will not delve into the sixth
amendment question. See also, Comment, The Supreme Court 1967 Term, 82 HAv.
L. REv. 63, 236-38 (1968).
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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problem. The recent judicial trend favoring the admissibility of out-
of-court statements by witnesses unavailable or unable to testify
threatens to encroach upon the criminal defendant's constitutional
right to confront witnesses against him.' A recent decision of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals resolved this conflict to the detri-
ment of the defendant's constitutional right.
In United States v. Payne,"0 the Fourth Circuit dealt with a prob-
lem focusing on the conflicting admissibility requirements of the con-
frontation clause and the hearsay rule. The petitioners, Roland, Hu-
bert and Clifford Payne, were convicted of conspiracy for obtaining,
possessing and passing counterfeit Federal Reserve Notes in violation
of federal law." Four other codefendants, including the petitioners'
brothers Chester and Burrell, pleaded guilty to the same charges. In
an interview prior to pleading guilty Burrell gave a statement to
Secret Service Agent Donald in which he not only confessed his own
guilt, but also implicated the petitioners." Due to Burrell's claims of
dizziness and lack of memory, the interview was terminated before
he signed the statement. At Burrell's arraignment Agent Donald tes-
tified regarding the confession he received from Burrell, although
that statement was not admitted into evidence, and Donald made no
reference to its implication of the petitioners.
At the petitioners' trial Burrell was called as a government wit-
ness, but when questioned he claimed no recollection of pleading
guilty, of any scheme to counterfeit notes, or of talking with Secret
Service agents. 3 The government used the statement made to Agent
Donald in a fruitless attempt to revive Burrell's memory. Agent Don-
ald then took the stand and testified as to the substance of Burrell's
'Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1971). Mr. Justice Marshall dissented, comment-
ing:
I believe the Confrontation Clause has been sunk if any out-of-court
statement bearing an indicium of a probative likelihood can come in,
no matter how damaging the statement may be or how great the need
for the truth-discovering test of cross-examination.
Id. at 110.
10492 F.2d 449 (4th Cir. 1974).
"18 U.S.C. §§ 472, 473 (1970).
"Portions of Burrell's statement implicating the petitioners stated: "I got about
35 counterfeit $10 bills from Hubert. At this time Hubert did not ask for any money
for these bills nor did I give him any . . . " and "I would like to add that I believe
my brothers Hubert, Roland, Clifford and Chester also had some counterfeits." The
statement ended with the inscription: "Statement is incomplete and unsigned as sub-
ject complains of lapses of memory and dizzy spells." Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari
at 55-56, Payne v. United States, - U.S. - (1974).
"1492 F.2d at 450.
1975]
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statement." Subsequently the statement itself was admitted into evi-
dence over the objection of the defense counsel.15 Upon their convic-
tion the petitioners appealed to the Fourth Circuit on two grounds:
first, that the admissions of the statement and Agent Donald's testi-
mony were violations of the hearsay rule since Burrell did not make
his statement in court and the statement fell under no traditional
hearsay exception; and second, that the admission was unconstitu-
tional since Burrell, the accuser, did not make his statement in court
and the petitioners were denied any effective opportunity to confront
him on account of his memory loss.
The Fourth Circuit divided on whether the lower court properly
allowed Burrell's extra-judicial statement to be admitted into evi-
dence. The majority held that the statement had been sufficiently
tested for reliability and should not have been barred by a "mechani-
cal application" of the hearsay rule simply because the witness' mem-
ory failed at trial." The court further determined that Burrell's pres-
ence as a witness at trial satisfied the sixth amendment confrontation
requirement.' 7 In his dissent, Judge Widener disagreed on both the
hearsay and confrontation issues. He asserted not only that the state-
ment failed to qualify under any traditional hearsay rule exception,
but also that its reliability was not demonstrated by the facts. 8 He
urged that the right to confrontation could not be satisfied by the
mere physical presence of the witness at trial.
The disagreement between the majority and dissent in Payne re-
flects an ongoing debate concerning the development of the hearsay
rule. The majority embraced the "progressive school approach,"
which favors the admission of sufficiently probative evidence even in
the absence of a traditional hearsay exception.19 The dissent, on the
"This statement was hearsay, see note 3 supra.




"See, e.g., Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th
Cir. 1961). In an opinion by Judge Wisdom the Fifth Circuit upheld the admissibility
of a fifty-one year old newspaper article even though its admission fell under no tradi-
tional hearsay exception. Judge Wisdom urged that the article was sufficiently reliable
and that strict application of the hearsay rule would totally preclude admission of the
evidence contained in the statement. Id. at 392.
Caution, however, should be taken in applying the rationale of this case to crimi-
nal cases, in which a higher standard of reliability may be required. See also United
States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964) (Friendly,
J.); Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925)
(Hand, J.); Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969); Gelhaar v. State, 41
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other hand, illustrated "traditional school," the which excludes all
hearsay evidence not falling within an inveterate exception."0 The
difference in the two opinions regarding the sixth amendment right
to confrontation is more fundamental: whether the confrontation
clause merely requires that the prosecution produce the corpus of the
witness against the accused, or whether, as the dissent asserted, it
demands practical considerations to insure the accused the right to
meaningful confrontation of witnesses against him. The significance
of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Payne lies in its exemplification
of a trend in the hearsay-confrontation area of the law of evidence.
The Evidentiary or Hearsay Problem
The Fourth Circuit initially indicated that Burrell's statement
was within the recorded past recollection exception to the hearsay
rule.2' Shifting its focus to the prior inconsistent statement exception,
which allows a previous statement inconsistent with the testimony of
the witness to be admitted to impeach his credibility,22 the court
noted that the minority view on the scope of this exception would
support the admission of Burrell's statement as substantive evidence
as well as for impeachment purposes.? Judge Winter, writing for the
court, indicated that it was unnecessary to choose either the majority
"impeachment only" view, or the minority "substantive use" view,
stating that the reliability of a prior inconsistent statement given at
a former trial or before a grand jury had been sufficiently tested by
oath and potential cross-examination to allow admission of the mat-
ter contained therein.24 Recognizing that Burrell's statement was nei-
Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1969); Weinstein, Probative
Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REv. 331 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Weinstein, Probative
Force].
'*See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Taylor v. Baltimore
& O.R.R., 344 F.2d 281 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965); Ruhala v. Roby,
379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967); State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898
(1939); Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 76 (1971).
21492 F.2d at 451. The majority cited California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), in
support of its contention. The Fourth Circuit either misnamed the rule of which it
spoke or miscited its authority. Green involved a prior inconsistent statement, not a
recorded past recollection. The court's discussion indicates it was referring to the prior
inconsistent statement exception and not the recorded past recollection exception. For
an explanation of the recorded past recollection exception see note 31 infra.
22See notes 79-84 and accompanying text infra.
2See note 33 infra.
2492 F.2d at 452. The court cited United States v. Mingoia, 424.F.2d 710, 713 (2d
Cir. 1970) (government allowed to impeach witness with prior inconsistent statements
19751
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ther made under oath nor subject to cross-examination, Judge Winter
cited Burrell's silence during his arraignment, at which Agent Donald
testified concerning the general contents of the prior statement, as
amounting to a "tacit admission that the interview took place, that
he remembered it and that he acknowledged the correctness of Mr.
Donald's testimony . .. ."2 In conclusion Judge Winter noted that
the cumulative effect of all the facts, especially Burrell's arraign-
ment, so attested to the reliability of the statement that it should not
be barred by the hearsay rule."
The Fourth Circuit relied on two Second Circuit cases, United
States v. Mingoia 2 and United States v. Insana,'2 to support its con-
clusion that an inconsistent statement may, under proper circum-
stances, be admissible as substantive evidence. 9 While these cases
support the latter rationale, they do not propose the flexible hearsay
standard necessary to justify the court's logic in Payne. Mingoia in-
volved the impeachment of a witness with his inconsistent testimony
before a grand jury. The defendant objected that since the jury was
incapable of not using the impeachment evidence substantively, it
should not have been admitted. The Second Circuit held the im-
peachment proper and, in dicta, noted that the statement by the
witness before the grand jury could have been admitted as substan-
tive evidence.3 1 Similarly, in Insana a witness who had earlier testi-
and grand jury testimony); and United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970) (government witness became recalcitrant at trial because
of desire not to hurt anyone, court allowed witness' grand jury testimony as substantive
evidence).
11492 F.2d at 452.
2'Id.
-424 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1970).
-423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970). District Judge Bartels,
sitting by designation, wrote the Second Circuit opinion.
21rhe Fourth Circuit also cited California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970). In
Green the Supreme Court was confronted with an attempt by the California legislature
to alter the state's hearsay rule to allow the admission of prior inconsistent statements
as substantive evidence at trial. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966). The Court did
not rule on the hearsay issue, indicating that state courts or legislatures have the
discretionary power to amend their own rules of evidence, but decided only the con-
frontation issue. Mr. Justice White in the majority opinion stated:
Our task in this case is not to decide which of these positions, purely
as a matter of the law of evidence, is the sounder. The issue before us
is the considerably narrower one of whether a defendant's constitu-
tional right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" is nec-
essarily inconsistent with a State's decision to change its hearsay rules
to reflect the minority view ....
399 U.S. at 155.
1424 F.2d at 713. The Court commented:
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fled before a grand jury feigned memory loss at trial. The court of
appeals held that the trial judge had discretion in the admission of
prior grand jury testimony when the witness was present at trial and
his failure to testify was attributable not to memory failure, but to a
desire not to "hurt anyone.
' '3
1
In Payne the Fourth Circuit confused the hearsay exception it
initially cited, recorded past recollection, 3 and then rejected the prior
inconsistent statement view33 which could have logically supported
Although Paulsen's statements to the F.B.I. would not be admissible
as affirmative evidence of guilt under De Sisto [329 F.2d 929], those
statements contained the same material as his grand jury testimony.
There was no error in admitting the challenged testimony and, at least
as to the prior grand jury testimony, the trial judge's instruction
[limiting the evidence to impeachment] was more favorable to Min-
goia than he was entitled to get.
Id.
31The hearsay portion of Insana was also dictum, since the appellant challenged
the admission of the evidence only on constitutional grounds. 423 F.2d at 1170.
"'Recorded past recollection actually is a generic term involving two sub-
principles. First, present recollection revived is a theory under which a witness may
refresh his memory by reading from a record made by him when the event was fresh
in his mind. He then testifies from his refreshed memory. Cf. Jewett v. United States,
15 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1926).
Recorded past recollection also may allow a record made by the witness when-the
event was fresh in his memory to be read into evidence when the witness is unable to
revive his memory. See, e.g., United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1949).
To insure the accuracy of the recorded past recollection certain requirements must
be met. First, the witness must be able to identify making the memorandum-which
Burrell could not. Next, the witness must adequately recall making the record at or
near the time of the event-which Burrell did not. Finally, the witness must testify to
the accuracy of the memorandum-which Burrell could not. Jordan v. People, 151
Colo. 133, 376 P.2d 699, 702, cert. denied, 373 U.S. 944 (1963). See also United States
v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966); Mathis v.
Stricklind, 201 Kan. 655, 443 P.2d 673 (1968); State v. Legg, 59 W. Va. 315, 53 S.E.
545 (1906); PROP. FED. R. Evm. 803(5); MCCORMICK §§ 299-303; 3 WIGMORE, LAW OF
EvIDENCE § 747 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE, (Chad-
bourn)].
3The general principle behind the exclusion of prior inconsistent statements is
that such statements are subject to neither oath nor cross-examination and are not
made in the presence of the trier of fact. The exception generally limits the admission
of such statements to impeach the credibility of the witness, and to cancel out the
harm which the witness' in court testimony has caused the proponent's case. See, e.g.,
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 983 (1973); Bushaw v. United States, 353 F.2d 477 (9th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921 (1966); United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836 (1963); Young v. United States, 97 F.2d 200 (5th
Cir. 1938); People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968);
Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967); State v. Saporen, 205 Minn.
1975]
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its holding. Further, the two Second Circuit cases Judge Winter cited
fail to support the exception upon which he attempted to rely. He
asserted that the reliability of testimony given before a grand jury
was assured because it was rendered under oath and potentially sub-
ject to cross-examination.34 These are not the same assurances named
by the Second Circuit in Insana and Mingoia, but are rather the
assurances of reliability found in the prior testimony exception to the
hearsay rule.35
The Second Circuit indicated that the oath administered at the
grand jury proceeding, coupled with the witness' presence for cross-
examination at trial, sufficiently insured the reliability of the prior
inconsistent statement to warrant its submission to the jury for con-
sideration." The Second Circuit's holdings in Insana and Mingoia do
not support the Fourth Circuit's supposition that total memory fail-
ure renders prior statements inconsistent, let alone the court's im-
plied assumption that statements neither conceded nor denied at a
guilty plea arraignment contain the same attributes of reliability as
prior testimony.
The Fourth Circuit analyzed Burrell's statement to Agent Donald
and the subsequent arraignment as a branch of the prior testimony
exception to the hearsay rule. 37 Unlike the prior inconsistent state-
358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939); MCCORMICK § 251; 3A WIGMORE, (Chadbourn) § 1018;
BEAVER & Biggs, Attending Witnesses' Prior Declarations as Evidence: Theory vs.
Reality, 3 IND. LEG. F. 309 (1970).
A number of courts have allowed the admission of prior inconsistent statements
not only for impeachment purposes and the cancellation of harm, but also for the
statements' substantive value. The qualification placed on this exception is that the
declarant must presently be in court and subject to cross-examination. By this means
courts and commentators adopting the minority view feel the out-of-court statement
regains much of its lost assurances of reliability. See, e.g., United States v. Williamson,
350 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1026 (1972); United States v. De
Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964); People v. Williams, 9
Cal. 3d 24, 506 P.2d 998, 106 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1973); Vance v. State, 190 Tenn. 521, 230
S.W.2d 987, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 988 (1950); PROP. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A); CAL.
EvID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966) (Comment, Law Revision Comm'n); MCCORMICK § 251;
Weinstein, Probative Force at 331.
31492 F.2d 451-52.
3See note 37 infra.
11424 F.2d at 713; 423 F.2d at 1169.
3Former testimony is evidence which may be introduced under the hearsay rule
even though the declarant may not be present at trial. The guarantors of reliability
are the oath and cross-examination under which the testimony was initially given.
Since the present defendant is not able to challenge the statements directly, it is
required that the previous defendant have had a similar interest and motive in cross-
examination. See Young v. United States, 406 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (testimony
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ment and recorded past recollection exceptions, which rely on the
availability of the witness for cross-examination at trial,3 the basis
for assuming the reliability of prior testimony is that the witness was
subject to oath, cross-examination, and perjury charges for false
statements at the former proceeding.39 These are the same factors
which insure the reliability of statements made in the presence of the
trial court." A prerequisite to the use of former testimony is the
unavailability of the declarant to testify at the present trial,4 or if
joined with the prior inconsistent statement exception, an inconsis-
tency between the former testimony and the present testimony.2
Neither Second Circuit case cited in Payne dealt with the pure
before grand jury does not satisfy former testimony exception because of lack of cross-
examination); Holman v. Washington, 364 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1966) (enumerating the
requirements for admission of prior testimony); United States v. Graham, 102 F.2d 436
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 643 (1939) (admission of former testimony for substan-
tive purposes held proper); Gaines v. Thomas, 241 S.C. 412, 128 S.E.2d 692 (1962)
(deceased witness' testimony at former trial admissible when parties had like inter-
ests); MCCORMICK § 256; 5 WIGMORE § 1388; Donnelly, The Hearsay Rule and Its
Exceptions, 40 MINN. L. REv. 455 (1956); Falknor, Former Testimony and the Uniform
Rules: A Comment, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 651 (1963).
Judge Winter neither admitted using a former testimony rationale, nor is it appar-
ent that he realized he was doing so. However, the importance he attached to Burrell's
arraignment, Agent Donald's testimony at the arraignment, and Burrell's failure to
controvert the evidence when given the opportunity, evidences concern with the same
considerations relevant in determining the admissibility of former testimony. Judge
Winter admitted that the two most important criteria were missing: "technically it
[Burrell's statement] had not been sworn to, or he cross-examined." 492 F.2d at 452.
"See note 36 supra.
"In United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979
(1964), Judge Friendly stated:
Testimony at a former trial has already been once subjected "to the
test of Cross-Examination" on which our law places primary reliance
for the ascertainment of truth. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1362 (3d ed.
1940). Both such testimony and evidence before a grand jury have had
the sanction of what Wigmore calls the "prophylactic rules" relating
to the oath and to perjury, influencing "the witness subjectively
against conscious falsification, the one by reminding of ultimate pun-
ishment by a supernatural power, the other by reminding of speedy
punishment by a temporal power." 6 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1813,
1831 (3d ed. 1940).
329 F.2d at 934.
"0See Morgan, Hearsay Dangers at 183-85.
"See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (witness died prior to
second trial).
"See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 102 F.2d 436 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S.
643 (1939) (prosecutor allowed to use witness' former testimony when witness denied
truth of that testimony). See also United States v. Mingoia, 424 F.2d 710 (2d Cir.
1970).
1975]
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former testimony exception. The exception proposed in Insana was a
hybrid, assimilating characteristics of the former testimony and the
prior inconsistent statement exceptions with the defendant's present
opportunity for cross-examination. Insana suggests that under proper
circumstances a feigned loss of memory can be considered inconsist-
ent,43 so that testimony given at a former proceeding may be admitted
as substantive evidence as well as to impeach the witness' credibil-
ity." Yet the facts in that case were substantially different from those
in Payne. The witness in Insana had made inculpatory statements
regarding the defendant to the grand jury, but at trial had a change
of heart and admittedly feigned memory loss to avoid incriminating
the defendant.1
5
The Second Circuit did not assert that all instances of memory
loss would render prior statements inconsistent, nor did it state that
all grand jury testimony was admissible as substantive evidence.
Rather, the Second Circuit left to the trial judge discretion to admit
or exclude prior statements given under oath when the witness ob-
viously feigns memory loss at trial.4" The court recognized that total
memory failure would bar admission of the prior statement under the
traditional prior inconsistent statement theory.4" The grand jury pro-
ceeding was important because the statement given at the proceeding
was made under oath, thus fulfilling the first requisite of reliability.4"
The presence of the witness for cross-examination at trial and before
the jury were the second and third elements of reliability in Insana.45
Hence the statement given at the grand jury proceeding possessed the
assurances of reliability required by traditional doctrine: an oath
given at the grand jury stage, cross-examination at trial, and presence
11423 F.2d at 1170.
"Id. at 1169.
'Id. at 1168. Judge Bartels commented: "Shurman took the stand and was at all
times available for cross-examination. We are far from convinced that such cross-
examination would have been fruitless in view of his obvious desire to help Insana."
Id.
4"Id. at 1170. The Second Circuit emphasized:
Where . . . a recalcitrant witness who has testified to one or more
relevant facts indicates by his conduct that the reason for his failure
to continue to so testify is not a lack of memory but a desire "not to
hurt anyone," then the court has discretionary latitude in the search
for truth, to admit a prior sworn statement which the witness does not




'Id. See also Plop. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (Advisory Committee Note).
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of the witness before the trier of fact at trial 0
The admission of Burrell's statement in Payne does not fall under
the "Insana exception." Unlike the witness in Insana, Burrell gave no
testimony, either at his arraignment or at trial.5' In addition, the trial
court concluded that Burrell's memory loss was real,5" obviously not
feigned as was the witness' in Insana. Most importantly, neither at
his arraignment nor at trial was Burrell under oath or subject to cross-
examination with regard to the content of his statement
3
Similarly, Burrell's arraignment failed to meet the former testi-
mony assurances of reliability which are based not only on the oath,
but also upon cross-examination at the former proceedings by some-
one representing interests similar to those of the defendant. 4 The
former proceeding, Burrell's guilty plea arraignment, only involved
Burrell's plea, not the inculpation of the petitioners. He was inter-
ested in pleading guilty, not in challenging incriminating evidence,
hardly the type of situation which guarantees vigorous cross-
examination.55 Further, Burrell was subject to neither oath nor cross-
examination, nor was his statement entered into evidence where its
authenticity and accuracy could be challenged. The thrust of the
majority opinion was that although the reliability of Burrell's state-
ment was guaranteed neither by a traditional hearsay exception, nor
by the Second Circuit's "Insana exception," the peculiar facts of the
case indicated sufficient reliability to bar a "mechanical application
of the rule against hearsay evidence." 5
"See note 76 and accompanying text infra.
"1492 F.2d at 452.
"Id. at 456.
oRuhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967). The Court recognized:
Cross-examination pre-supposes a witness who affirms a thing being
examined by a lawyer who would have him deny it, or a witness who
denies a thing being examined by a lawyer who would have him affirm
it. Cross-examination is in its essence an adversary proceeding. The
extent to which the cross-examiner is able to shake the witness, or
induce him to equivocate is the very measure of the cross-examiner's
success.
If he [the witness] refuses to adopt his prior statement as true,
there can be no adversary cross-examination upon it ....
150 N.W.2d at 156.
5See note 37 supra.
OSee, e.g., United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); D.
NEWMAN, CONVICTION, THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOuT TRIAL 8
(1966).
"492 F.2d at.452.
3'7The majority's most contorted rationalization was the attempt to find the assur-
ances of oath and cross-examination, though technically lacking, at Burrell's arraign-
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Contrary to the majority's "sufficient reliability" approach to the
hearsay question, Judge Widener's dissent followed traditional analy-
sis. Unable to place Burrell's statement under an existing hearsay
exception, Judge Widener flatly rejected its admission. Recognizing
that Burrell's failure to verify the statement precluded its admission
ment. Judge Winter asserted that Burrell's "silence" during Agent Donald's sworn
testimony was a "tacit admission" that the agent's testimony was accurate, and since
the testimony Donald gave at the arraignment was consistent with Burrell's statement,
thus the statement, including the portions implicating the petitioners, must likewise
be accurate. 492 F.2d at 452. The concept of qui tacet consentire videtur, he who is
silent appears to consent, is well established in the law of evidence, but equally well
established is the condition that silence is an admission only when no other explana-
tion for silence exists. Cf. Northern Ry. v. Page, 274 U.S. 65 (1927); Kelly v. United
States, 236 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1956); 2 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 13:49 (6th ed. 1972); 4
WIGMORE (Chadbourn) § 1071.
Presumably Judge Winter was not attempting to analogize Burrell's arraignment
to a trial. Yet the assurances of trustworthiness he extracted from the arraignment are
the same guarantors relied on under the former testimony exception. The oath, though
technically absent, could be found implicitly in Agent Donald's testimony since the
testimony was given under oath and was consistent with the statement. The cross-
examination test, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, was satisfied by Burrell's opportunity
to challenge Donald's testimony. Although the court admitted that both oath and
cross-examination were missing, it indicated that the requirements were met construc-
tively at the arraignment.
Judge Winter's constructive oath and cross-examination are subject to criticism.
Primarily, although Burrell had the opportunity to challenge Agent Donald's testi-
mony, the agent was reciting only what Burrell had told him. Thus, only the accuracy
of Donald's transcription was tested. Burrell, who made the statement, was never
subjected to cross-examination on the facts contained in the statement. Next, the
nature of the proceeding-a guilty plea arraignment-cast doubt upon the existence
of any adversary process which would insure reliability of the statement. Finally, the
absence of any reference to statements inculpating the defendant, the fact that Burrell
did not testify at his arraignment, and the lack of any meaningful cross-examination
at the present trial certainly cast doubts upon any resemblance to the criteria of former
testimony. Cf. United States v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168, 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 906 (1967) (former testimony was introduced to impeach a witness, but Judge
Friendly held that where the prior testimony was given at a different trial with differ-
ent issues, the evidence should be excluded for substantive purposes).
This reasoning also creates a potential constitutional objection as Judge Widener
noted. 492 F.2d at 452. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the court held
that the co-defendants could not be tried together when the confession of one might
inculpate others. The trial of the petitioners and Burrell was severed before Burrell
pleaded guilty. By introducing Agent Donald's testimony and Burrell's statement,
which were tantamount to oral and written evidence of Burrell's confession including
implication of the petitioners, the Fourth Circuit violated the Bruton doctrine. It
would be anomalous to allow the admission of confessions when co-defendants are tried
separately, but not when they are tried together.
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under the recorded past recollection exception," and that a guilty
plea arraignment was not an acknowledged guarantor of the reliabil-
ity of a confession, he explained that the statement did not fall under
any recognized exception. 9 Judge Widener rejected the majority's
finding of sufficient reliability, reasoning that Burrell was never sub-
ject to oath or cross-examination on the statement, and further, that
the portions of the statement implicating the brothers were never
brought into issue at Burrell's arraignment. Additionally he noted the
established rule that the confession of one accomplice may not be
used against another."0
The dissent also indicated that the admission of the statement
violated the doctrine of Bruton v. United States,' which prohibits
admission of the confession of a codefendant at a joint trial when the
confession also implicates another defendant, and that the statement
did not fall within the purview of the traditional co-conspirator ex-
ception to the hearsay rule.6" That exception allows statements made
by co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy to be admitted as
substantive evidence, but in Payne the conspiracy ended before Bur-
rell made his statement to Agent Donald. 3 The fact that it was un-
signed and incomplete, and that Burrell was allegedly suffering from
dizziness and lapses of memory made the statement itself "suspect
on its face."64 In conclusion, Judge Widener rejected the statement
as inherently unreliable.
In analyzing Payne as a step in the evolution of the hearsay rule,
recognition of what the Fourth Circuit attempted to do, as well as the
end result of its decision, is important. Unlike Judge Widener's dis-
sent, which followed the conventional approach by attempting to
pigeonhole the facts under a recognized exception, the majority en-
deavored to avoid the traditional dogma and fashion a more flexible
approach to the delineation of hearsay rule exceptions." In so doing,
8See note 32 supra.
"492 F.2d at 456.
"°See, e.g., Phillips v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 207, 116 S.E.2d 282 (1960) (admis-
sion of sodomy by one defendant not admissible against another); Tong's Case, Kely-
ing 18, 84 Eng. Rep. 1061, 1062 (K.B. 1663).
"1391 U.S. 123 (1968).
"In Bruton the court objected to the admission on sixth amendment confrontation
grounds, not hearsay rules. Id.
"See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, - U.S. _ 94 S.Ct. 3090 (1974); Lutwak
v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440
(1949).
"1492 F.2d at 457.
0Cf. Weinstein, Probative Force.
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it tacitly approved a doctrine of judicial discretion 6 which could,
however, lead to arbitrary results. Although Judge Winter refrained
from expressly embracing a novel approach to the hearsay rule, his
opinion represents a trend away from rigid adherence to the tradi-
tional hearsay exceptions. The apparent reasoning behind this trend
is that the more evidence that is presented to the jury, the more
accurate its judgment will be. Since the traditional exceptions often
preclude the admission of evidence they are replaced by a decision
of the trial judge, who has the discretion to admit evidence when he
determines that the potential unreliability is outweighed by the pro-
bative value of the evidence." The problem emanating from the
Fourth Circuit's handling of Payne is the court's failure to temper its
relaxation of the hearsay rule with any objective standard of
trustworthiness beyond "sufficient reliability." Ultimately such a
standard may effectively replace reliability of evidence with conveni-
ence in the admission of evidence, which would be contrary to the
purpose of the hearsay rule.
The hearsay rule is a child of the jury system." It developed out
of fear that the jury would be misled by out-of-court statements and
ex parte affidavits by persons who were neither challenged by cross-
examination, nor subject to oath. The ultimate goal of the rule is to
prohibit the submission of unreliable evidence to the trier of fact.
"See, e.g., United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165, 1170 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 841 (1970); United States v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168, 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 906 (1967) (Friendly, J.); United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964) (Friendly, J.); United States v. Block, 88 F.2d 618 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 301 U.S. 690 (1937) (Hand, J.); Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925) (Hand, J.).
"Weinstein, Probative Force at 331. Professor Weinstein defines probative force
as "power to convince a dispassionate trier of fact that a material proposition . . . is
probably true or false." Id. He suggests individual treatment of hearsay evidence by
trial judges on a case by case basis rather than by application of the traditional
exceptions. Although he asserts that the class exceptions may be "mechanically"
applied by trial judges and lend stability to the law of evidence, they fail to account
for individual attributes of reliability or unreliability. When the probative force of the
evidence is high, yet no applicable class exception exists, Professor Weinstein's theory
allows the trial judge discretion to admit the evidence to the jury. See generally Wein-
stein, Probative Force.
"Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 391 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1961); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 218-21 (1942).
"During the Middle Ages no rule similar to the hearsay rule existed. At the early
stages of the jury system jurors handed down their opinions from their own personal
knowledge, which must have included some hearsay. During the sixteenth century, as
the process of witnesses giving oral testimony in court developed, the hearsay rule
evolved as part of the general question of sufficiency of proof. Gradually hearsay
became recognized as inferior to direct testimony. Hearsay became admissible only as
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The oath, presence of the witness before the trier of fact and, most
importantly, cross-examination, are believed to insure reliability."
The exceptions which developed were consistent with the purpose
of the rule because the circumstances under which they arose7' at-
tested to the trustworthiness of the evidence, and strict adherence to
the hearsay rule would have deprived the jury of valuable evidence.
72
As the number of exceptions grew they became tightly structured. In
Pavlovian fashion any evidence falling under a recognized exception
was admitted, regardless of its reliability, while sufficiently reliable
evidence not falling under a traditional exception was excluded. 3 As
courts have become conscious of the anomalies inherent in such a
rigid application, a trend has developed favoring admission of hear-
say evidence in the absence of a traditional exception when the facts
of the case indicate commensurate reliability.
74
corrobative evidence, and finally, "in the second decade after the Restoration ... the
modem rule that hearsay is wholly inadmissible [came] to be generally recognized."
9 HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 217 (1926). Soon after its development the
necessity for exceptions to the rule arose. The general theory behind the rule was that
cross-examination was the best test of the accuracy of evidence. The exceptions devel-
oped where the accuracy of the evidence was sufficiently developed so as to make cross-
examination a "work of supererogation." See 3 BLACKSTONE, LAWS OF ENGLAND, 368-
376 & n.11 (15th ed. 1809); 9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 211-19 (1926); 1
GREENLEAF § 124; MCCORMICK § 244; 5 WIGMORE § § 1364, 1420.
7See Morgan, Hearsay Dangers at 185-86.
"See, e.g., Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933) (dying declaration);
United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966)
(records of past recollection); State v. Carr, 67 S.D. 481, 294 N.W. 174 (1940) (testi-,
mony from former hearing); In re Estate of Simms, 442 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969) (declaration against interest); Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 153
S.W.2d 681 (1941) (testimony at former trial); Business Records Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1732
et seq. (1970); Morgan, The Relation Between Hearsay and Preserved Memory, 40
HARv. L. Rxv. 712 (1927).
72See, e.g., PROP. FED. R. EvID. 801, 803 (Advisory Committee's Notes);
MCCORMICK §§ 254, 262, 282, 299, 306; 5 WIGMORE §§ 1363, 1420; Morgan, Hearsay
Dangers at 179; Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 Gzo.
WASH. L. REv. 76, 89 (1971).
7'See generally McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Sub-
stantive Evidence, 25 TEx. L. REv. 573 (1947); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers; Weinstein,
Probative Force.
'See Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1961); Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
929 (1970); Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969). See also United States
v. Mingoia, 424 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970); United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964); Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925); People v. Green, 3 Cal. 3d 981, 479 P.2d 998, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 494, cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971).
1975]
258 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Payne reflects an attempt to
adhere to the principles of this trend. Finding the statement suffi-
ciently reliable even in the absence of oath, cross-examination, or any
traditional attribute of reliability, the majority rejected "mechanical
application" of the hearsay rule.75 However, the weakness in Judge
Winter's opinion is the failure to establish any formula to justify his
conclusion of "sufficient reliability." Indeed, the court indicated that
it utilized the Insana exception to the prior inconsistent statement
majority rule,"8 yet proceeded to determine trustworthiness in a fash-
ion strangely analogous to the former testimony exception. 7 Neither
of these exceptions are supported by the facts in the case. The Fourth
Circuit seems to have conferred upon the trial judge limitless discre-
tion to admit evidence when he feels that the cumulative impact of
the circumstances attests to its reliability.
In pursuing the contemporary trend toward judicial discretion the
Fourth Circuit apparently ignored the recognized distinction between
the admission of a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment
purposes and its admission for substantive use. Traditional doctrine
would have allowed introduction of Burrell's statement to impeach
his credibility"8 if his memory loss were shown to be inconsistent with
his prior testimony.7 9 However, the judge would have been required
to instruct the jury that it might use the evidence only to analyze the
veracity of the witness and not as proof of the matter contained in
the statement." Within the framework of this conventional rationale
11492 F.2d at 451-52.
7SId.
"See note 37 supra.
"See, e.g., United States v. Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 983 (1973); Bushaw v. United States, 353 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 921 (1966); United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 836 (1963); Young v. United States, 97 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938); Ruhala v.
Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967). Cf. State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285
N.W. 898 (1939).
"Compare People v. Green, 3 Cal. 3d 981, 479 P.2d 998, 1002, 92 Cal. Rptr. 499,
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971) (inconsistency in effect rather than express terms
is the test for admitting the prior statement) with People v. Sam, 71 Cal. 2d 194, 454
P.2d 700, 77 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1969) (failure of memory is not an inconsistency). See also
United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970)
(genuine memory loss is not inconsistent); Taylor v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 344 F.2d 281
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965) (loss of memory insufficient to constitute
inconsistency); 3A WIGMORE (Chadbourn) § 1043 (unwilling witness may take refuge
in memory loss, must use prior statement to impeach).
"See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 446 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971) (judge's statements to jury limiting its use of prior statement of witness
to impeachment of his credibility validated admission); Young v. United States, 97
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the error in Payne arose from the failure of the trial judge to instruct
the jury to limit its use of the statement to impeachment, not from
introducing the statement itself into evidence. A finding of harmless
error by the Fourth Circuit would have thus upheld the convictions
with regard to the hearsay objections." The obstacles which pre-
vented a showing of inconsistency and harmless error would have
been no more difficult to overcome than those encountered by the
Fourth Circuit in admitting the statement as substantive evidence.2
However, the distinction between the use of evidence for impeach-
ment purposes and its admission as affirmative proof has not gone
without opposition. The admission of a prior statement to impeach
the credibility of a witness, while expecting the jury not to use it
substantively, has been criticized as requiring an exercise of "mental
gymnastics of which jurors are happily incapable."83
The doctrine of judicial discretion, implicit in the court's opinion,
has been suggested and utilized by other courts.84 However, use of
judicial discretion in the admission of hearsay evidence in the past
has required some objective elements of reliability in addition to
subjective judicial evaluation." Even in those progressive decisions
which have admitted statements not falling under any traditional
hearsay exception, requirements of necessity and trustworthiness
F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938) (use of prior inconsistent statement of witness limited to
negative the adverse effects of his testimony).
"See United States v. Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
983 (1973) (pre-trial statement of government witness admitted when witness repu-
diated truth of statement, failure of trial judge to give instruction limiting jury's use
of statement to impeachment of the witness held to be harmless error).
82Although the trial court found that Burrell's memory failure was genuine, 492
F.2d at 456, his brother Chester testified that he was unaware that Burrell suffered
any memory problems. Further, Burrell's statement was only a portion of the prosecu-
tion's case. The testimony of other witnesses contributed to the evidence against the
petitioners. See note 88 infra.
'3 United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979
(1964) (Friendly, J.). See also Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609, 613
(1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970).
"See, e.g., United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 934-35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 979 (1964); Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
268 U.S. 706 (1925) (latitude to be allowed in cross-examination of recalcitrant witness
is wholly within discretion of trial judge); Weinstein, Probative Force at 338-41.
"United States v. Mingoia, 424 F.2d 710, 712 (2d Cir. 1970) (prior statement given
under oath); United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
841 (1970); United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
979 (1964) (identification had been made under oath); Di Carlo v. United States, 6
F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925) (identification made before witness
had motive to fabricate, and in presence of defendant who acquiesced).
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have been met.8 Neither requirement was satisfied in the Payne deci-
sion, nor was any standard suggested other than implicit confidence
in the ability of the trial judge to perceive reliability. The value of
Burrell's statement as substantive evidence was slight. It contained
only minor references to the petitioners87 and the prosecution intro-
duced other more substantial evidence inculpating the defendants.8
The majority asserted that the statement was credible,8" yet it was
never subject to any objective guarantee of reliability. Extending the
Payne rationale to its logical conclusion leaves nothing of the hearsay
rule,9" it eliminates oath, cross-examination, presence of the witness
before the trier of fact, and any measure of trustworthiness. The trend
away from rigid adherence to the hearsay rule seeks to make it more
flexible, not to eliminate it as a meaningful rule of evidence." Thus,
not only did the Payne majority fail to articulate the rationale under
which it presumably attempted to justify admission of the statement,
but in addition, the progressive test itself was not satisfied.
The Constitutional or Right to Confrontation Issue
The situation in Payne created by Burrell's statement, his loss of
memory and his subsequent inability to testify presented not only a
hearsay problem but a constitutional issue as well. The sixth amend-
ment guarantees the criminal defendant the right to confront wit-
"See, e.g., Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th
Cir. 1961). Judge Wisdom noted two prerequisites necessary to admit a hearsay state-
ment in the absence of a traditional exception: necessity and trustworthiness. See also
Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 76,
89 n.114 (1971) (necessity and trustworthiness are the standard rationale in the dying
declaration exception).
81See note 12 supra.
IsBrief for Appellee at 4, Payne v. United States, 492 F.2d 449 (4th Cir. 1974).
89492 F.2d at 452.
wrhe Fourth Circuit's rejection of the hearsay rule in Payne parallels its holding
in United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979
(1974). In another opinion by Judge Winter, the Fourth Circuit in Woods upheld the
admission of prior similar incidents, contrary to the traditional American rule, to prove
the corpus delicti of murder. As in Payne the decision strained logic. Unlike Payne the
evidence met the demands of necessity and reliability. See Comment, The Admissibil-
ity of Prior-Crimes Evidence in Prosecutions for Child Abuse, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
207 (1974). See also Note, Evidence, 43 U. CiN. L. REV. 437 (1974); Note, Evidence, 52
TEx. L. Rav. 585 (1974).
"Beaver & Biggs, Attending Witnesses'Prior Declarations as Evidence: Theory vs.
Reality, 3 IND. LEG. F. 309 (1970). The author suggests a policy reason against elimina-
tion of the hearsay rule: "[Tihe unrestricted use of police-station statements would
'increase both the temptation and opportunity for the . . . manufacture of evidence'
.... defendants would similarly entrap or coerce substantive exculpatory proof." Id.
at 315, quoting, State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 361-62, 285 N.W. -898, 901 (1939).
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nesses against him:2 Like the hearsay rule, the confrontation clause
necessitates the presence of the prosecution's witnesses at trial. 3 The
phraseology of the clause appears to admit no exception, but courts
have not always applied the language strictly. 4 Indeed, some authori-
ties have even attempted to graft the traditional hearsay exceptions
onto the confrontation clause.'- The Fourth Circuit in Payne held
that the mere physical presence of a witness against the accused
satisfied the confrontation clause. The majority perceived the sixth
amendment as basically a procedural requirement, while the dissent
emphasized the substantive guarantee to the criminal defendant.
The portion of Judge Winter's opinion addressing. the constitu-
tional problem in Payne relied upon the Supreme Court's rationale
in California v. Green." That case involved a legislative amendment
to California's hearsay rule permitting the admission for substantive
purposes of prior inconsistent statements of witnesses present at
trial.9 The defendant in Green was convicted of narcotics violations
due largely to the statement of a witness who testified at a prelimi-
nary hearing and had earlier given a statement to police.' ® At trial
the witness became evasive and claimed loss of memory, although he
confirmed making the statement and his belief in its accuracy. Sub-
sequently, under the authority of the new statute, the prosecution
entered the prior statement and preliminary hearing testimony into
evidence.'9 '
Upon conviction, the defendant appealed to the California Su-
preme Court,9 2 which held that the admission of the prior statement
and testimony violated the sixth amendment, and the state then
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which found no con-
frontation clause violation'3 since the declarant was subject to full
"See note 1 supra.
"35 WIGMORE § 1397.
"See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895);
Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409 (1954). Contra, Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135 (1945).
"Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S.
542 (1926).
"1492 F.2d at 453-54.
"Id. at 462-65.
"-399 U.S. 149 (1970).
"CAL. Evm. CODE § 1235 (West 1966).
"'399 U.S. at 151.
"'Id. at 151-52.
'"People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969), rev'd,
399 U.S. 149 (1970).
'"Although Green was a state case involving state laws the Supreme Court in
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and effective cross-examination at trial.10' The Court noted that the
witness' testimony at the preliminary hearing was given under oath
and subject to cross-examination by the defendant, who was aided by
counsel. The preliminary hearing testimony satisfied the confronta-
tion clause requirements independently of the defendant's opportun-
ity to confront the witness at trial.15
The situation in Payne differed from that in Green. Most impor-
tantly, Burrell's statement was neither given under oath nor subject
to cross-examination. Also of significance was the fact that Burrell
never admitted making the statement, nor did he attest to its accu-
racy, which the witness in Green did at trial.' Never were the peti-
tioners able to question Burrell on the substance of his statement; yet
the defendant in Green not only challenged the witness on his state-
ment, but was able to make the witness retreat from his accusation.0 "
Judge Winter recognized the dissimilarity of the two cases, but indi-
cated that the difference was only in degree and that application of
the Green rationale to the facts in Payne was proper.'
Mr. Justice White in Green noted that the purpose of the confron-
tation clause is three-fold: first, to insure that the witness will be
subjected to cross-examination; second, to assure that statements
will be given under oath; and third, to guarantee that the jury will
have an opportunity to observe the witness' demeanor.0 9 The out-of-
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), held that the sixth amendment applied to the
states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Chief Justice
Burger's concurring opinion in Green intimates that this application may not be abso-
lute. 399 U.S. at 171. See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (discussing the hazard of applying Bill of Rights to states via the four-
teenth amendment).
10O399 U.S. at 158.
"'Id. at 165. The court commented regarding the admission of the witness' state-
ment to police:
Porter's preliminary hearing testimony is not barred by the Sixth
Amendment despite his apparent lapse of memory, the reception into
evidence of the Porter statement to Officer Wade may pose a





"'1492 F.2d at 453.
1D3 99 U.S. at 158. Mr. Justice White commented:
Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his statements
under oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter
and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury;
(2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the "greatest
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court statement in Green regained these protections when the witness
was present and testified in court. Thus the crucial inquiry Justice
White made was whether "subsequent cross-examination at the de-
fendant's trial will still afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for
evaluating the truth of the prior statement.
110
The Fourth Circuit did not answer this question in terms of a
"satisfactory basis for evaluating," but rather indicated that Bur-
rell's availability for cross-examination about contemporaneous
events and his memory failure would provide the jury with a "sub-
stantial basis" to determine the truthfulness of the prior statement.'
Judge Winter de-emphasized the lack of oath and the absence of any
effective cross-examination by noting that the jury's decision was still
made on what it saw and heard in court."' Such reasoning seems to
ignore the confrontation clause guarantee. Unlike the hearsay rule,
which is designed to aid the jury in its evaluation of the evidence by
requiring evidence to be presented in court, the confrontation clause
is a positive guarantee to the criminal defendant of the right to chal-
lenge his accusers."' The Fourth Circuit's reasoning would support
convictions based on unsworn, unchallengeable evidence, the admis-
sion of which would also violate the hearsay rule, as long as the jury
received the evidence at trial."1
The three elements of confrontation posited by Justice White in
Green"5 were not satisfied in Payne. The majority admitted that
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth"; (3) permits the
jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of




"'492 F.2d at 454.
"1id. Judge Winter quoted from Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Di Carlo v.
United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925). The witness
had identified the defendant before the grand jury, but at trial he became recalcitrant
and refused to testify. Judge Hand's statements were directed toward the evidentiary
admissibility of the prior identification, not the constitutional admissibility.
"'See, e.g., Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1965).
"'See United States v. Block, 88 F.2d 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 690
(1937) (Judge Hand reversed a conviction based on the statements of a witness given
the prosecutor, but denied at trial).
"'Mr. Justice White's three purposes of confrontation-oath, cross-examination,
and the jury's observance of demeanor- are the same elements Professor McCormick
cites as central to the hearsay rule. Although Justice White posits the same three
elements, confrontation and hearsay are not co-extensive, and this comingling of ele-
ments is indicative of the confusion in definition of terms. See McCORMICK § 245.
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there was effectively no cross-examination"' and that the statement
was never admitted or denied under oath."7 Moreover, the jury con-
cluded from their observance of Burrell's demeanor that his memory
loss was real."' Thus, although the prosecution produced Burrell
physically, he was effectively unchallengeable on his prior statement
and the petitioners were left with only the bare opportunity of con-
frontation.
Judge Widener's dissent on the confrontation issue in Payne cen-
tered on the ancestry of the confrontation clause in an attempt to
demonstrate the substantive right as well as the mere physical pres-
ence requirement."' As a preface to his dissent Judge Widener cau-
tioned against undue reliance on Green. He pointed out that the sixth
amendment may not be as strictly applied to the states as it is in
federal prosecutions.' In searching for the substantive purpose of the
confrontation clause he traced its history through the constitutional
debates and ultimatley to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.' Judge
Widener contended that the confrontation clause regulated trial pro-
cedure by requiring the witness to testify against the defendant
openly and in view of the jury. 2 Although noting that both the hear-
11492 F.2d at 454. Judge Winter noted: "It is true that by reason of Burrell's claim
of complete failure of recollection, the scope of effective cross-examination excluded





1"492 F.2d at 457.
Following the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, cases did not immediately
apply the Bill of Rights to the individual states. This included the right to confronta-
tion. West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904). See generally Fairman, Does the Four-
teenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). Later,
however, the Court applied the confrontation clause to the states through the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). As
Judge Widener noted, Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Green points out
the importance of allowing state innovation, thus inferring that the states may not be
held strictly to the confrontation clause. See also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,
371-72 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring, stressed the importance of flexibility in applica-
tion of sixth amendment to States to allow States experimentation with non-
unanimous jury verdicts).
2 Raleigh was convicted of treason on the basis of an ex parte affidavit by Lord
Cobham, who was in prison in the same building. Despite Raleigh's pleas to confront
him, Lord Cobham was never produced at trial. See, WIGMORE § 1364; C. BowEN, THE
LION AND THE THRONE 202-04 (1956).
I14 92 F.2d at 458. See also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), where
the Court stated:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to
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say rule and confrontation clause originated from the same abuse,
trial by ex parte affidavit, he stressed that the right to confrontation
is broader than the procedural requirement of the hearsay rule. 12 The
confrontation clause was added to the Constitution to prevent the
abuses that were possible even under the common law hearsay rule.' 2
Judge Widener expressed the fear that by merely addressing the
question of the sufficiency of the defendants' opportunity to cross-
examine Burrell, the majority tacitly accepted Professor Wigmore's
notion equating the confrontation clause with the rules of evidence.'1
Judge Widener suggested that three principal elements have de-
veloped which guarantee the criminal defendant substantive confron-
tation of his accusers. The first element to evolve was that requiring
the witness to testify in court, enabling the jury to observe his de-
meanor as he confronted the defendant with his accusations. Next
came the right to cross-examination, allowing the defendant to chal-
lenge the accusations against him, and forcing the witness to answer
for inconsistencies and weaknesses in his statement. Finally, the right
of the defendant to have counsel for the purpose of cross-examining
the witness evolved. 2 1 Under these criteria, Burrell's failure to state
prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes
admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which
the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection
and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to
stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which
he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
156 U.S. at 242-43.
'"492 F.2d at 458. The abuse that necessitated both the hearsay rule and confron-
tation clause appears to have been the use of ex parte affidavits by the prosecution
against the defendant. The trial of Raleigh was perhaps the most publicized of the
abuses. See note 121 supra. The incorporation of the right to confrontation into the
Constitution reaffirmed the defendant's right and protected it from the infringement
that occurred under common law exceptions to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895);
F. HELLER, THE SIxTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 104-05
(1951) [hereinafter cited as HELLER]; 5 WIGMORE § 1364; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers
at 179-83; Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 746-47 (1965).
'12492 F.2d at 459.
1"5Professor Wigmore surmised that the Constitution prescribed only the type of
procedure to be followed at trial-cross-examination; not the type of statements to be
taken infra-judicially, which were determined by the law of evidence. 5 WIGMORE §
1397.
12492 F.2d at 464. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In that case the
prosecution attempted to introduce the transcript of a preliminary hearing in which a
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his accusations on the stand in the presence of the defendants and
jury violated the confrontation clause. Inquiry into the effectiveness
of the petitioners' cross-examination opportunity, the question which
Justice White thought primary in Green, was therefore academic.'
Although Judge Widener indicated that cross-examination was
the second element in the chronological development of the right to
confrontation, this element is not only the single most important
guarantee,'28 but also constitutes the ultimate difference between the
dissent and the majority in Payne. Moreover, cross-examination is
the common thread between the hearsay rule and the confrontation
clause. 2 ' Judge Winter found no denial of cross-examination since
the witness was produced and the petitioners were provided with an
opportunity to ask questions, thereby satisfying in his opinion both
the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause.'30 Judge Widener, on
the other hand, emphasized that the failure of Burrell to reiterate his
accusatory statements at trial constituted a violation of the right of
confrontation, since the statement could not be challenged in a truly
adversary cross-examination.' 3'
witness who was unavailable for trial gave testimony against the defendant. The defen-
dant was present at the hearing and was given an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, however, the Court noted that the defendant's lack of counsel at that time
denied him adequate cross-examination and hence violated his confrontation right.
"'Essentially Judge Widener agreed with the Harlan-Wigmore theory that the
hearsay rule is a rule of evidence, while the confrontation clause is a rule of proce-
dure-cross-examining procedure. 492 F.2d at 464; see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
93 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); 5 WIGMORE § 1397. However, a prerequisite to the
cross-examining procedure is the requirement that the accusing witness be present in
court. 492 F.2d at 464.
'2 Mr. Justice White stated: "Viewed historically . . . there is good reason to
conclude that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-
of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to
full and effective cross-examination." 399 U.S. at 158.
'ICross-examination is an important element in both the hearsay rule and the
confrontation clause and has on occasion been equated with one or both. However, the
purpose served by the cross-examination under the two requirements is not the same,
nor are the confrontation clause and hearsay rule co-extensive. Cross-examination
under the hearsay rule is a method of insuring the accuracy of the evidence. See
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers at 185. In the confrontation clause it is the primary element
in the defendant's right to challenge the accusations against him. See Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). Failure to distinguish the different purposes served by
cross-examination under the two rules is a major source of confusion and generally
leads to an equating of hearsay and confrontation, or equating cross-examination with
one or both. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94-95 (1970). Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring, stated that the confrontation clause only requires evidence taken at trial
to be taken under a cross-examining procedure. The law of evidence, not the confronta-
tion clause, governs what type of statements may be taken infra-judicially.
'1°492 F.2d at 454.
'Id. at 463-64.
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The nature of cross-examination and its relationship to the defen-
dant's right to confrontation have troubled courts and confounded
commentators.' 32 Unlike the hearsay rule requirement of cross-
examination, which safeguards the reliability of the evidence and is
dispensable if the trustworthiness of the evidence can be demon-
strated by other means,'33 the cross-examination requirement of the
confrontation clause is a substantive right guaranteeing the criminal
defendant the opportunity to challenge his accusers in an adversary
process.' 34 A simple denial of cross-examination has been held to
violate the confrontation clause, '3 yet an earlier opportunity to cross-
examine the witness has been considered sufficient to satisfy the sixth
amendment requirement in the absence of the witness' physical pres-
ence at trial.'36 Mr. Justice White indicated in Green that no confron-
tation problem would arise in the admission of an out-of-court state-
ment if the witness was subject to "full and effective" cross-
examination at the time of the trial. 3'
Unlike the witness in Green, who, although suffering impaired
memory, took the stand and admitted that he made the statement
and believed in its accuracy,' 38 Burrell's total memory loss prevented
any affirmation of the authorship of his statement, or acknowledge-
ment of the statement's veracity. Payne presented a situation more
"'Compare Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (confrontation is a trial right
including both opportunity to cross-examine and an occasion for jury to weigh de-
meanor of the witness) with California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (confrontation requires only production of witness for cross-examination
by defendant) and Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) (denial of cross-examination
is denial of right of confrontation). See also 5 WIGMORE §§ 1395, 1397.
InSee notes 5, 67-69 supra and accompanying text.
13'See, e.g., Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-20 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 403 (1965); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900); Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
"'See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
""See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (preliminary hearing cross-
examination held to satisfy confrontation); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965)
(right to confront is basically cross-examination, and opportunity to cross-examine
could suffice in absence of physical presence); United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d
Cir. 1971); 467 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973) (refusal of
government witness to take oath, to testify at trial and to succumb to cross-
examination by defense did not render grand jury testimony admissible since defen-
dant had no opportunity to cross-examine).
in399 U.S. at 159. The Court commented: "[The inability to cross-examine the
witness at the time he made his prior statement cannot easily be shown to be of crucial
significance as long as the defendant is assured of full and effective cross-examination
at the time of trial." Id.
"'399 U.S. at 152.
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analogous to that in Douglas v. Alabama,'39 in which a co-defendant
made a statement incriminating the defendant. Upon being called to
the stand the co-defendant claimed privilege against self-
incrimination and refused to testify. The substance of his earlier
statement was read to the jury under the guise of refreshing the
witness' memory.'40 The Supreme Court held that the failure of the
witness to confirm or deny the statement attributed to him precluded
effective cross-examination, and thus deprived the defendant of the
right to confrontation.'
Viewing cross-examination as fundamentally an adversary pro-
cess,'42 its effectiveness is contingent upon the witness asserting his
accusation at trial and in the presence of the accused.4 3 The claim
of privilege by the witness in Douglas denied the defendant the oppor-
tunity of challenging the statement. Similarly, Burrell's memory loss
prevented his affirmation or denial of the statement's implications
and precluded any possibility of the defense counsel discrediting the
statement through cross-examination. Unlike the situations in which
a witness discredits an out-of-court statement attributed to him by
denying authorship of the statement or admitting authorship but
denying the truth of the statement,' Burrell neither denied making
'39380 U.S. 415 (1965).
"Id, at 416-17.
1"Id. at 419-20. The Court stated: "[Pletitioner's inability to cross-examine Loyd
as to the alleged confession plainly denied him the right of cross-examination secured
by the Confrontation Clause . . . . [E]ffective confrontation of Loyd [the witness]
was possible only if Loyd affirmed the statement as his." Id.
iJRuhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967). The court noted:
Cross examination presupposes a witness who affirms a thing being
examined by a lawyer who would have him deny it, or a witness who
denies a thing being examined by a lawyer who would have him affirm
it. Cross-examination is in its essence an adversary proceeding. The
extent to which the cross-examiner is able to shake the witness, or
induce him to equivocate is the very measure of the cross-examiner's
success.
150 N.W.2d at 156.
'"But cf. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-44 (1895) (technical
adherence to the letter of the constitution would carry the right farther than the public
good warrants, therefore, a copy of a deceased witness' testimony at a former trial
where the defendant was able to cross-examine him does not violate the spirit of the
clause).
"'In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), Justice White posited that the
defendant's task in cross-examination may actually be enhanced by a witness' prior
inconsistent statement:
The defendant's task in cross-examination is, of course, no longer
identical to the task that he would have faced if the witness had not
changed his story . . . . The difference, however, far from lessening,
may actually enhance the defendant's ability to attack the prior state-
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it nor refuted its accuracy. Further, Payne was not analogous to the
situation in which a witness confirms authorship and the accuracy of
the statement and is subject to cross-examination, since Burrell's
inability to remember making the statement rendered him unavaila-
ble for adversary purposes. Burrell's memory loss effectively made
the statement impregnable since "defense counsel cannot probe the
story of a silent witness and attempt to expose facts that qualify or
discredit it."'
' 45
The adversary nature of cross-examination under the confronta-
tion clause guarantee gives substance to the criminal defendant's
right under that clause and constitutes the essential difference be-
tween the clause's cross-examination requirement and the procedural
cross-examination'46 aspect of the hearsay rule. Procedural cross-
examination requires only that the defendant have an opportunity to
cross-examine.' 47 Its purpose is to insure the trustworthiness of evi-
dence, but when cross-examination is impossible it may be waived if
other circumstances attest to reliability.' Substantive confronta-
tion, on the other hand, is the indispensable right of the criminal
defendant to hear the accusations directly from the accuser and then
to challenge those statements.' Judge Widener emphasized this in
ment. For the witness, favorable to the defendant, should be more
than willing to give the usual suggested explanations for the inaccu-
racy of his prior statement ....
Id. at 160.
151d. at 192 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"'Compare Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th
Cir. 1961) (cross-examination dispensable under hearsay rule when facts attest to
reliability) with Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959) (Supreme Court has
zealously protected criminal defendants right of confrontation and cross-examination
from erosion).
"'Cf. State v. Logan, 344 Mo. 351, 126 S.W.2d 256 (1939); 5 WIGMORE § 1396.
'IsSee Morgan, Hearsay Dangers. Professor Morgan contends:
The theory of the system is that in the contest between the parties,
each interested to demonstrate the strength of his own contentions
and to expose the weakness of his opponents', the truth will emerge
. Where, however, helpful data are available only through one
who cannot be subjected to the conditions usually imposed on a wit-
ness, it becomes important to determine to what extent the reception
of the data under conditions which do not satisfy the usual protective
tests will serve to accomplish the objectives of the trial and yet not
expose the trier to appreciable danger of being misled.
Id. at 185. See also note 19 supra.
"'See, e.g., Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). Mr. Justice Harlan stated:
[A] fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot
be proved against an accused ... except by witnesses who confront
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his dissent. Mr. Justice White stressed the "face to face encounter"
and the witness' open accusations in court as forming the "core of the
values" furthered by the confrontation clause. 5 More than proce-
dural cross-examination, the sixth amendment requirements guaran-
tee the defendant a right that counterbalances those of his oppo-
nent-the aid of legal counsel at cross-examination.'15
The majority in Payne ignored the adversary nature of confronta-
tion, thereby providing the defendants with nothing more than the
procedural opportunity to view their accuser. Judge Winter assumed
that the sixth amendment only imposes an obligation on the prosecu-
tion to produce its witnesses, rather than creating a right guaranteed
to the defendant. The majority purported to base its decision on
Justice White's "full and effective" cross-examination criteria, but
appeared to follow Justice Harlan's concurrence in Green, in which
he stated that physical production of the witness at trial satisfied the
confrontation clause.'52 Judge Winter responded to the White criteria
with the Harlan answer: "Burrell was produced as a witness and he
was available for cross-examination."' 53 Moreover, the majority ig-
nored the fact that Harlan favored a due process standard in dealing
with the law of evidence, and under this standard would have re-
manded Green for a determination of whether the witness' memory
failure so deprived the defendant of cross-examination as to violate
due process.'54
him at the trial, upon whom he can look while being tried, whom he
is entitled to cross-examine, and whose testimony he may impeach in
every mode authorized by the established rules governing the trial or
conduct of criminal cases.
Id. at 55. See also Young v. United States, 406 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
111399 U.S. at 156-57.
"'See HELLER at 104. See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-04 (1965). This
case is discussed in note 126 supra.
152399 U.S. at 174.
"1492 F.2d at 454.
154399 U.S. at 188-89.
Justice Harlan opposed the "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment generally, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 174-75 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting), and specifically the sixth amendment
confrontation clause. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 172 (1970). In Green he pro-
posed that the constitutional standard to guide the states was merely a due process
standard of fundamental fairness and not rigid application of the confrontation clause.
This theory was further modified in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94-95 (1970) (Har-
lan, J., concurring).
As did Green, Dutton dealt with a state alteration of the hearsay rule, but, going
beyond his Green opinion, Justice Harlan indicated his belief that the confrontation
clause was an impractical instrument for dealing with evidence questions. He sug-
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The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the sixth amendment as an obli-
gation on the prosecution ignores the essential purpose of the confron-
tation clause, which is to guarantee the criminal defendant the right
to challenge his accusers.'5 Courts have admitted prior statements of
witnesses who were genuinely unavailable for trial when there was a
preliminary or previous opportunity for cross-examination.' 8 This is
the type of situation in which courts have analyzed the sixth amend-
ment as obligatory upon the prosecution. If the defendant has had an
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, if the government has
attempted to procure his attendance and he is truly unavailable, then
the confrontation clause is not violated by admission of the out-of-
court statement. 57 This was the essence of Douglas.
gested that the fifth and fourteen amendment due process clauses were better able to
deal with the rules of evidence. 400 U.S. at 96-97.
Harlan indicated that historical understanding of the confrontation clause was of
no value to its contemporary application. Essentially, he asserted that it mandates
only the type of procedure that must be followed at trial, that being a cross-
examination procedure. See also 5 Wigmore § 1365. Harlan did not believe that the
confrontation clause demanded production of witnesses at trial. His contention was
that such a rule would curtail the natural development of the law of evidence. 400 U.S.
at 96. Harlan stated that the laws of evidence compelled the presence of the witnesses
at trial, not the sixth amendment.
The due process standard, as Harlan saw it, was more flexible and able to adapt
to continuing evolution in the law of evidence. Similarly, the due process standard
would apply equally to the rules of evidence in both civil and criminal cases, something
the confrontation clause did not accomplish since it applied only to criminal prosecu-
tions. Finally, Harlan contended that a strict application of the confrontation clause
would often preclude submission of evidence to the jury. 400 U.S. at 99.
This due process argument is subject to several major criticisms. Most basically
it sacrifices the right of the defendant for the expediency of the admission of evidence.
Second, similar to the trend in evidence, see note 19 supra, it gives the trial judge
unbounded discretion in the admissibility of questionable evidence. Finally, Justice
Harlan affixed common law hearsay exceptions to the due process clause, thus subject-
ing the defendant's constitutional rights to the whims of the rules of evidence.
'"See HELLER at 104-06.
'5aSee, e.g., United States v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237 (1895). See also Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900) (preliminary
hearing testimony, where defendants cross-examined witness, is not admissible when
the witness' unavailability at trial is the fault of the government).
'"Compare Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (at the second trial of
the defendant the prosecution was allowed to read into evidence the testimony from
the first trial of a key prosecution witness who had since died; the defendant had cross-
examined the witness at the first trial) with Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (the
government attempted to introduce testimony from the preliminary hearing of a defen-
dant now in jail; even though the defendant had had opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, the failure by the prosecution to use diligence in procuring the witness' pres-
ence at trial precluded use of the testimony). See also Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
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In producing the witness at trial the prosecution in Douglas had
fulfilled its obligation to the fullest extent. Yet the defendant had
never challenged the witness "face to face." Thus the confrontation
clause was not satisfied even though the witness was physically pres-
ent. Similarly, the production of Burrell in Payne satisfied the gov-
ernment's obligation, yet his memory loss deprived the petitioners of
any adversary cross-examination, or any cross-examination with re-
gard to the statement. The government's obligation to produce the
witnesses against the accused is not, as envisioned by the Fourth
Circuit in Payne, the sole requirement of the confrontation clause,
but is merely a step necessary to insure the defendant's right to
confrontation.
Conclusion
In Payne the Fourth Circuit recognized that the hearsay rule is not
a dogmatic principle designed to frustrate the admission of evidence.
In an attempt to join a trend toward making the rule more flexible,
the court examined the cumulative nature of the circumstances at-
testing to the reliability of Burrell's out-of-court statement. 15 8 Noting
the circumstances, especially Burrell's arraignment, the court indi-
cated that the statement should not be barred by strict application
of the hearsay rule. '59
Although a trend toward more flexible application of the hearsay
rule may be desirable, the Fourth Circuit failed to articulate any
obective criteria to guide courts in the determination of reliability.
By the nature of its decision judicial discretion will seemingly be the
sole factor in the determination of trustworthiness. Such reliance
upon the trial judge's subjective perception of the evidence leaves
little or nothing of the traditional hearsay rule requirements of oath,
cross-examination and presence of the witness before the trier of
fact.' 0 Earlier cases have dispensed with one or even two of these
415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S.
458 (1900).
'58See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970); United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841
(1970); United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979
(1964); Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1961); Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969); Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis.
2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970); CAL. Evm. CODE §
1235 (West 1966); PROP. FED. R. EVID. 801-06 (Advisory Committee Notes).
"'492 F.2d at 454.
1"'See note 3 supra.
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requirements,'"' but Payne eliminated all three without introducing
any substitutes. The result of giving the trial judge such wide discre-
tion may lead to confusion among barristers as to what evidence they
should plan to present, confusion among trial judges as to what con-
stitutes "sufficient reliability," and appellate court dockets crowded
with applicants claiming improper admission or exclusion of evi-
dence.'1
2
The confrontation clause is not as flexible and prone to evolution
as the laws of evidence, and infringement upon a defendant's right
to cross-examination erodes one of the basic principles of our system
of justice.'63 The decision in Payne indicated that the sixth amend-
ment was satisfied by the mere physical production of the witness at
trial. That finding is inconsistent with the intent of the confrontation
clause, which is to guarantee the criminal defendant the substantive
right to challenge, in an adversary proceeding, witnesses against
him.
64
Statements of a witness not present at trial were admitted in
Green, however, the Fourth Circuit's reliance upon the Supreme
Court's decision in that case was misplaced. In Green the defendant
confronted the witness at the preliminary hearing, and the witness'
memory loss at trial did not preclude his admitting authorship of the
statement. Burrell's claimed memory loss was total, thus the defen-
dants could not challenge him. The Supreme Court's decision in
Douglas stressed that physical presence of a witness cannot satisfy
the confrontation clause when the defendant is unable to cross-
examine the witness.6 5 The Fourth Circuit seemingly overlooked
Douglas in its justification of the statement's admission into evi-
dence.
Judge Widener's dissent in Payne adopts the preferable view. The
confrontation clause requires not only the procedural opportunity to
cross-examine, but requires as a minimum that the witness reiterate
at trial his accusations against the defendant. The subsequent cross-
"'See, e.g., United States v. Williamson, 450 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1026 (1972) (admission of technically inadmissible statement is cured by
opportunity of defendant to cross-examine declarant); Di Carlo v. United States, 6
F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925) (identification made under oath
is admissible at trial, even though witness could not affirm it). Cf. Virgin Islands v.
Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 547-48 (3d Cir. 1967) (presence of declarant before tribunal to
judge demeanor is not essential).
"'See Rucker, The Twilight Zone of Hearsay, 9 VAND. L. REv. 453, 485 (1956).
iaCf. Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959).
"'See, e.g., Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965).
"1380 U.S. at 419-20.
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examination is then an adversary proceeding giving substance to the
accused's confrontation right. This is consistent with the notion of
confrontation set forth by the Supreme Court in Douglas. The consti-
tutional right to confrontation must never be sacrificed to the conven-
ience of admitting questionable evidence.
WILLIAM WORTHINGTON
